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My book Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception1 had more than one goal. The most
important of these was to draw attention to just how much progress could be
made in various debates in aesthetics if we make more use of the arguments
and conceptual apparatus of philosophy of perception. Aesthetics is about
experiences – special kinds of experiences we care a lot about. So turning to
philosophy of perception, the philosophical subdiscipline that is about
experiences, is a natural move. 
What do I mean by aesthetics here? The book is about aesthetics, not
philosophy of art. Philosophy of art is a motley ensemble of debates and puzzles
that have to do – one way or another – with art, some metaphysical, some ethical,
linguistic, or epistemological. It would be fairly crazy to claim that philosophy of
perception would have any kind of priority in solving problems in philosophy
of art. But aesthetics is different from philosophy of art – as many philosophers
of art are quick to emphasize. Aesthetics is not exclusively and not even primarily
about artworks, it is also about our aesthetic engagement with nature and
everyday scenes, for example. 
And what do I mean by philosophy of perception? Philosophy of perception is
about the perceptual domain and its relation to other parts of the mind. It is not
exclusively about perception. So when I say that philosophy of perception can be
a useful way of tackling problems in aesthetics, I am not assuming that aesthetic
phenomena are exclusively or essentially perceptual. Crucially, no matter how
narrowly we construe it, philosophy of perception is partly about phenomena
like mental imagery and attention and both of these concepts play an important
role in understanding various problems in aesthetics. 
That is the second, narrower aim of the book: to use the concept of attention
as an illustration of how and to what extent aesthetics can learn from philosophy
of perception. What sets aesthetic engagement apart from other moments in our
life is a difference in what we attend to and how we do so. Attention can have
a huge impact on our experiences in general and on our aesthetic engagement
more particularly. Attending to some irrelevant or distracting feature can
completely derail our experience. And much of the point of talking about art,
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music, literature, and other aesthetic phenomena is that it could get you to attend
to features you have not attended to before and by doing so completely new
and often very rewarding experiences open up. It is certainly the job of any critic
to get the reader to attend to some features of the artwork that would lead to
different, more interesting or more pleasurable experiences. 
I use these considerations to argue that the kinds of features, or, as
philosophers like to call them, properties, that play the most important role in
aesthetics are what I call ‘aesthetically relevant properties’: if you attend to these
properties, it makes an aesthetic difference. Putting ‘aesthetically relevant
properties’ at the centre stage of aesthetics is a not so concealed way of trying to
dethrone the old and venerable concept of ‘aesthetic properties’, which much
of Western aesthetics has been focusing on for centuries, but even more so in
the last half-century. Being beautiful is an aesthetic property as is being graceful
or being ugly. Many have tried to give a clear-cut definition of aesthetic properties
and many have failed. There is wide disagreement about some of the most
basic questions concerning aesthetic properties (Are they evaluative? Are they
perceived?). That is an embarrassment for the entire discipline of aesthetics. We
really need a fresh start. And we can have a fresh start if we talk about
‘aesthetically relevant properties’ instead of ‘aesthetic properties’. My pitch is that
by shifting the emphasis from aesthetic properties to aesthetically relevant
properties we can make progress in many old questions in aesthetics. The critic’s
job is not to tell us what aesthetic properties the work has. It is rather to draw
your attention to new, unsuspected aesthetically relevant properties that can
transform your experience. And contemporary art is blatantly not about aesthetic
properties, but it is very often about making seemingly aesthetically irrelevant
properties aesthetically relevant. 
Finally, the third, even more narrow, aim of the book was to explore a very
special way of exercising our attention. Vision science makes a distinction
between focused and distributed attention: we can attend to just one object or
to many objects at the same time. But the distributed versus focused distinction
can be applied not only to attending to objects, but also to attending to
properties. So there are four possibilities when it comes to attention: focused with
regard to both objects and properties, distributed with regard to both objects
and properties, distributed across objects, but focused on one property thereof
and focused on one object, and distributed across many of the properties of this
object. This latter way of exercising attention is what I take to be typical (but
neither necessary nor sufficient) of some paradigmatic forms of aesthetic
experience that have often been discussed not only by philosophers, but also by
artists and writers in the last two hundred years in the West. 
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It is important to emphasize that the aesthetic experience I was trying to
characterize in terms of attention focused on one object but distributed across
the properties of this object is both geographically and historically very limited
in scope. It is a typically Western phenomenon and one that arguably only began
to become important a couple of centuries ago and that, to make an even more
tentative claim, might be on its way out (as the smartphone generation is not too
strong on distributed attention). So the aesthetic experiences, which I deliberately
labelled ‘Proustian aesthetic experiences’, form a spatially and temporally highly
specific phenomenon – not some kind of cultural universal. In fact, part of 
the motivation for writing the book was to point out how the way we exercise
our attention changes over time, giving rise to very different perceptual and
aesthetic experiences. 
It is important to emphasize that the aim of this book is not to annex aesthetics
to the empire of philosophy of perception. My aim, in spite of the deliberately
provocative title of the book, was much more modest: I wanted and still want
aesthetics to learn from philosophy of perception. And I also think that a fair
chunk of the subject matter of aesthetics, but by no means all of it, is very closely
related to that of philosophy of perception. This does not mean that aesthetics is
about perception. It is also about all kinds of other exciting mental phenomena,
like mental imagery, attention, emotions, beliefs, hopes, aspirations, and expec -
tations. However, we have a lot of evidence from psychology and neuroscience
that all these mental states influence perception – even the earliest stages of
perceptual processing. So we can’t give a full account of perception without
talking about all these mental states. 
I use a fair amount of empirical findings throughout the book – from cross-
cultural psychophysics findings about attention to neuroscientific evidence for
top-down influences on the primary visual cortex. And neuroscience has been
widely used in aesthetics, at least since the neuroaesthetics movement of 
the 1990s. I should emphasize that what I am doing is very different from these
neuroaesthetics approaches (this is an important similarity between my book and
Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture).2 My aim is not finding out about
some universal features of our engagement with art on the basis of neuroscience.
I do not apply neuroscience to aesthetics directly – as it has often been pointed
out, this can go wrong very easily. Instead, I use philosophy of perception, which
is informed by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience, to shed light on
old problems in aesthetics. So the link between neuroscience and aesthetics is
mediated by philosophy of perception. 
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A perk of this approach is that what empirically grounded philosophy of
perception should teach us is that looking for aesthetic universals – the hidden
or more often not so hidden aim of neuroaesthetics – is futile given the top-down
influences on our perception that make perception very different in different
periods and different parts of the world. So using empirically informed philosophy
of perception to enrich aesthetics forces us to take the cultural variations of our
aesthetic engagement seriously, paving the way to a truly global aesthetics.
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